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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Nature and Importance of the Problem 
Hog production in the United States is concentrated in the North-Cen-
tral region and includes a large number of pork slaughter-processing plants 
differing in size, technology, age, overall cost level and geographic loca-
tion. 
Various problems have forced many packers to close some of their 
plants. Besides the problems related to recession and inflation, the pork 
packing industry is facing over-capacity, unequal labor costs and anti-
quated plants. 
An excess of capacity is frequently called the main problem of the in-
dustry. The costs and profit levels of slaughter plants are closely re-
lated to the volume of hogs going through the plant. When hog numbers are 
seasonal or cycl ical, fixed costs are much higher per hog processed. An-
other problem often mentioned is the higher wages some companies pay under 
the "master contract" with the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, in 
contrast to some new independent packers who have negotiated lower wage 
rates with other unions, or with nonunion employees. Finally, old plants 
are abundant in the Midwest, some even with sections that were built in 
the begi nning of the century . 
Combinations of these problems have forced many of the Corn Belt's 
major meat packers to close several large hog slaughter plants . Because 
hog slaughter plants are widely scattered throughout the hog production 
area, the closing of a large plant ca n represent a substantial change in 
the local market competition which could have an impact on the prices paid 
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to producers in the affected areas, and the cost and shrink involved in 
shipping hogs to more distant plants or buying stations. This is especial-
ly important for producers, since some may reconsider whether to keep pro-
ducing if they lose their usual market outlet, because of the expected 
price deterioration or added costs of marketing their hogs at more distant 
locations. Local cornnunities may also find infonnation about the producer 
price impact of a local slaughter plant useful when decisions must be made 
regarding tax and other incentives which might be used to attract a new 
p1ant or retain an existing plant in the cornnunity. 
Chronologically, several plants have closed which will be the focus of 
our analysis: Oscar Mayer's plant in Madison, Wisconsin (September 15, 
1978), John Morrell 's plant in St . Louis, Missouri (December 23, 1980), 
Swift's plant in Rochel le, Illinois (December 26, 1980), Oscar Mayer's 
plant in Davenport, Iowa (June 4, 1981), and Wilson's plant in Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma (August 13, 1981). Some aspects of the closing of the plant 
at Dubuque Packing Co. in Dubuque, Iowa (November 1, 1981) will also be 
analyzed. 
All of these plants remain closed, except the plant in Rochelle which 
was reopened by Dubuque Packing Co. on August 31, 1981. 
Purpose of the Study 
Thus, the primary focus of this study is to estimate the local market 
price impact of a change in the number of slaughter plants in the area. 
The more detailed objectives are: 
1) To determine whether significant changes occurred in the market 
price for hogs due to the closings of slaughter plants; 
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2) To determine the structural conditions associated with significant 
price changes; 
3) To determine how quickly significant changes in the level of prices 
occurred, if they existed ; and 
4) To determine how quickly market prices returned to "nonnal levels" 
under different structural conditions. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The analysis of changes in the competitive structure on the market 
prices for inputs does not have a strong theoretical background. The main 
assumption of the model of perfect competition does not seem to be met in 
the hog market because packers may have some local market power. We could 
consider the Midwest to be one large competitive market area for hogs where 
no single packer or plant has enough power to affect the general price 
level. But, in this study, we are interested in the local market effects, 
the changes in local prices paid to producers due to a change in the local 
market structure where individual packers or plants may have some market 
power due to their geographic location and distance from competitors. 
The analysis of the models of monopolistic competition does not give 
us any useful expectations related to a change in the number of competitors. 
Chamberlain's model of monopolistic competition assumes product differen-
tiation which does not seem to be the case of the hog market. It also as-
sumes that "each finn expects its actions to go unheeded by its rivals and 
to be unimpeded by any retaliatory measures on their part" (Mansfield, 
1979, p. 316), which does not seem to be the case today. Other models re-
lated to oligopoly, like Cournot's and Edgeworth's models are "extremely 
naive. They make the unrealistic assumrtion that a firm continually makes 
the mistake of assuming that its r ival s will not alter their output or 
price in response to the firm's own changes in output and price" (Mansfield, 
1979, pp. 338-339) . 
Sweezy 1 s kinked demand curve model to explain rigidity of prices in 
oligopoly is not useful, since Stigler found that "there was little 
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indication that an increase in price by one firm would not be matched, in 
general, by other finns" (Mansfield, 1979, p. 340). 
Some of the industrial organization empirical studies suggest that 
higher profits and prices are related to more concentrated markets. 
Scherer (1980, pp. 294-295) found 
... that there is considerable statistical support for industrial 
organization theory's predictions of a relationship among profitabil-
ity, seller concentration and barriers to entry. 
Marion et al. went further in relating prices, profits and levels of con-
centration. Their study of leading food chains suggested "that higher ob-
served profits are due largely to the higher prices chains are able to 
charge in less competitively structured markets" (Marion et al., 1979, p. 
432). They also found that the analysis 
... provides strong evidence that consumers pay substantially more 
in highly concentrated markets dominated by one or two firms than 
in less concentrated markets without a dominant finn (Marion et al., 
1979, p. 432). 
If these conclusions would apply to input markets, specifically to the 
hog industry, it would be expected that producers would get lower prices 
if markets became significantly less competitive and higher if the markets 
became significantly more competitive. One of the studies of plant 
closings and openings arrived at results that are not consistent with those 
expectations . 
The first of these studies was made by Love and Shuffett in 1965. They 
reported the results of an analysis of the effects on hog prices of the 
withdrawal of one of the buyers from the terminal market in Louisville , 
Kentucky, in April, 1960. They compared weekly prices of Louisville with 
the terminal markets in Indianapolis and Chicago by taking the price 
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differences between each pair of markets, averaging them, and using a 11 t 11 
test to compare the means before and after the plant closed. They found 
significant results in the comparisons of Louisville to Indianapolis and of 
Louisville to Chicago, but no significant difference h~tWPP.n the rrice of 
the terminal markets before and after the plant was closed . They concluded 
that 
. . . the decline in Louisville hog price as compared with that of 
Indianapolis and Chicago appears to be associated with the struc-
tural change in the Louisville market" (Love and Shuffet, 1965, 
p. 808). 
The other study in this area was done by Dobbins in 1973 . He tested 
the hypothesis that the opening of a hog slaughtering plant in the St. 
Louis area significantly raised the prices in that market . He analyzed the 
weekly price differential between St. Louis and other markets. He divided 
the series of differentials in three periods: period one consisted of 69 
weeks extending from January, 1969, through Apri l, 1970, when the national 
packer involved in the study was operating its plant in the area . Period 
two corresponded to 79 weeks between May, 1970, and October, 1971, when the 
plant was not operating. Period three corresponds to 61 weeks from Novem-
ber, 1971, through December, 1972, after a new plant was opened in the 
area. He used a 11 t 11 test similar to the procedure used by Love and Shuffet. 
Some of the results are the following: 
1) 11 Prices increased at the St. Louis Market relative to other markets 
between periods one and two, 11 after the first plant closed (Dobbins, 
1973, p. 46). 
2) There was an 11 increase in prices at the St . Louis market from period 
one to period three, relative to other markets considered. This 
7 
increase in the level of prices at St . Louis corresponds with the 
opening of the new hog slaughtering plant on that market and, there-
fore, appears to be associated with this structural change" 
(Dobbins, 1973, p. 46). 
3) "Prices in neighboring markets move together more closely than mar-
kets situated further apart" (Dobbins, 1973, p. 43). 
4) The variables "weight, grade, sorting practices, opening times and 
seasonal price differences, do not appear to be highly influential 
in affecting the changes in relative prices between markets during 
the time period considered" (Dobbins, 1973, p. 68). 
One important aspect about these conclusions is that the increase in 
relative prices associated with the reopening of the plant is consistent 
with the conclusions reached by Love and Shuffett about the relationship be-
tween lower relative prices and the withdrawal of a buyer. But, the first 
conclusion of Dobbins was not cons istent, sincethe closing of the plant was 
associated with higher relative prices from period one to period two. Dob-
bins presented three hypotheses to explain this phenomenon: 
1) Other packers "may have increased purchases there in an attempt to 
force the national packer to pay a higher price." These "predatory 
practices" were made because "the national packer had made a conmit-
ment by locating adjacent to the St. Louis National Stockyards" 
(Dobbins, 1973, pp. 73-74). 
2) "Anticipating the closing of the national packer's local plant in 
the St. Louis area, market personnel may have attracted outside 
order buyers to increase purchases at this market," compensating 
"for the reduction in local purchases as the result of the plant 
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closing, and thereby prompted an increase in prices" (Dobbins, 
1973, p. 74). 
3) 11 The increase in prices during periods one and two may have been 
due to a readjustment of supply and demand conditions at that mar-
ket" if the prices in period one were reflecting "a low level as a 
result of the closing" (Dobbins, 1973, p. 74). 
The fact that there are only two studies about this phenomenon, and 
that they arrived at mixed results, makes the analysis of several plant 
closings a very important tool to the general understanding of these situa-
tions. 
In addition to changes in the number of buyers, other factors may also 
influence relative prices . In particular, the influence of changes of sup-
ply on local prices has a strong theoretical support and needs further ex-
amination. 
The theory of market demand and supply suggests that, unless demand is 
infinitely elastic, an increase in the quantity supplied will result in a 
price drop in the relevant market in a magnitude that depends on the elas-
ticities of demand and supply. 
Mansfield says that "the finn's demand curve will generally be more 
price elastic than that facing the industry as a whole" (1979, p. 126), 
which implies that even in the case of perfect competition, where the de-
mand for the output of a finn would be infinitely elastic, we would expect 
the market demand not to be quite so. 
Thus, theoretically, we would expect local relative prices to have an 
inverse relationship with a change in the relative number of hogs supplied. 
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Dobbins (1973, p. 27) suggests that 
while changes in supply may have a short term effect upon price at 
a specific market, the shifting action by buyers tends to balance 
prices between relative markets and thus has a balancing effect upon 
relative supplies attracted to those markets . 
Love and Shuffett analyzed some cortelations between Louisville, In-
dianapolis and Chicago and concluded that "the low correlations indicated 
that factors other than relative supplies influence relative prices" (1965, 
p. 808). 
Even though the empirical studies about changes in local market struc-
tures have arrived to mixed results, and the "balancing effect" idea is in 
a developing stage, stil 1 the general economic frame\'t'Ork of perfect and im-
perfect competition can be used as guidelines in this study. It is ex-
pected that the entry or withdrawal of firms in a very atomistic market, 
where there are l ots of competitors with small market power, will have no 
noticeable impact on local relative prices. On the contrary, a structural 
change in a market with a few competitors is expected to have a noticeable 
impact on local relative prices. 
Further, one would expect in this study that significant effects on 
local relative prices, if any, will occur within the first six months after 
the closing. 
A final expectation is that the effectiveness of the market arbitrage 
after a structural change is related to the number of actual and potential 
competitors in the area. 
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CHAPTER III. METHODS 
The Relevant Market Defined 
This study has similarities with t he analysis used in the studies of 
Love and Shuffett and Dobbins. We want to compare the market prices in the 
areas where the change in the number of plants occurred with prices in mar-
kets where there were no structural changes. In the previous studies, 
there was no need to f ind sources of price data other than the tenninal 
market prices f rom the USDA, si nce the plants were located close to the 
tenninal markets. But, in this study, three of the five closing plants 
analyzed were located far from the tenninal markets . In those situations, 
prices were obtained from competitors' plants or buying stations within 
the relevant market of the closing plant. 
There i s not a unique definition of relevant market. Most of the ap-
proaches come from the court cases involving possible vio l ation of the 
antitrust l aws . Si nger selected some cases where indexes of concentration 
were considered inaccurate because they had not adequatel y detennined the 
relevant market for analysis. In the case of Bethl ehem in 1958, and later 
in t he Philadelphia National Bank case, the Supreme Court sa id: 
The detennination must be made on the basis of not only where the 
companies have i n the past made sa les, but also on the bas i s of 
whe re potentially they could make sales and where buyers could rea-
sonably turn to them as alternative substantial sources of supply 
(Singer , 1971, p. 253). 
It i s not where the parties ... do business or even where t hey com-
pete, but where , within the area of compet i tive overlap, the effect 
. .. on competitors will be direct and immediate . The boundari es of 
a relevant geographic market may extend beyond the area of actual 
competition and encompass areas of potential competit ion (Singer, 
19 71, p. 2 54) . 
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In the case of four slaughter plants, their procurement areas were 
defined to be the areas where each closing plant was buying hogs, and 
through personal interviews with the managers who identi fied their major 
and minor competitors in all parts of their hog procurement area . For the 
Oklahoma City plant, information on the market concentration in Oklahoma 
was obtained from a companion study by Ward (1982). 
The Markets 
Market prices in five areas where plants closed (and one reopened) 
were analyzed and compared to prices in other markets where there was no 
structural change during the period. 
Preliminary analysis suggested that the mai n effect of the structural 
changes should be observed soon after the plant cl osed . Also, a prel imi-
nary analysis suggested that price behavior preceding the six months prior 
to the closing did not add any useful information . Thus, the analy~is of 
the markets was done using price data for a six-month period before the 
closing and a six-month period after the closing. In a few cases, where 
the period under study for one market overlapped with the period of study 
for another market, and there was the possibility of an additive price im-
pact, a longer period was stud ied. 
Figure 1 shows the location of the plants which are the focus of this 
study, their hog procurement areas (obta ined through interviews with their 
personnel), and the terminal markets in the area. 
The location of the terminal markets with respect to the closing 
plants was the main reason for selecting some of them as bases for price 
comparison. The terminal markets selected were Indianapolis, Sioux Falls, 
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Sioux City, Omaha, South St. Joseph and Kansas City. These were all rela-
tively high-volume tenninal markets where prices were not expected to be 
significantly affected by plant closings or reopenings which occurred 
several hundred miles away. 
Data 
Average weekly prices for barrows and gilts grading US 1 and 2 and 
weighing from 200 to 230 pounds were obtained from the USDA Livestock Mar-
ket News. This weekly publication gives the average prices in all terminal 
markets and prices for hogs sold directly to packers in Iowa and Wisconsin. 
The data collected from this source were for the period January, 1978, 
through April, 1982. 
Average weekly prices paid by competitors for barrows and gilts of the 
same grade and weight were also computed at several buying stations near 
Rochelle for the period March, 1980, through April, 1982, and near Daven-
port during September, 1980, through April, 1982. These buying stations 
were located within a 30-40 mile radius of the closing plants. 
Hypotheses and Assumptions 
The most important hypotheses to be tested in this study are: 
1) Changes in the degree of competition affect the producers price 
level within the relevant market of the closing plant. 
2) The extent of price change will be greater in more highly concen-
trated markets. 
The basic assumptions of the study are: 
Terminal markets without structural changes can be used as unbiased 
bases for comparisons. 
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Variables such as weight, grade and opening times have no signifi-
cant effects upon weekly price differences between the subject mar-
kets and the average of the six control markets . 
Average weekly prices are close approximations to the true weekly 
price means. 
Statistical Procedure 
There are many factors that influence prices, but their contribution 
and importance are very difficult to measure. Fortunately, when differ-
ences are taken between two population means, some common factors cancel 
out or are minimized . The assumption that variables such as weight, grade 
and opening times have no significant effects upon the price differences 
mentioned is based on the fact that weights and grades were standardized 
for all the markets, and that most markets were in the same time zone with 
similar trading periods. 
The method of analysis employed to test the hypothesis that changes in 
the degree of competition affect the producer price level within the rele-
vant market involved the use of binary or indicator variables for each 
period before and after the structural change occurred. 
In each case study, the six month period prior to the plant closing 
(or reopening) was selected as the base for comparison and a series of two-
week time intervals after the plant closing (or reopening) were then used 
to see both the extent of price impact and the time interval required for 
competitors to effectively respond to the structural change and bring com-
petition in that area back to 11 nonnal level s ." The analysis used weekly 
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price differentials between the closing plants and the average of the six 
tenninal markets selected for comparison. 
The null hypothesis considered for this study is that the mean of the 
price differentials (for the jth market studied) is constant over time. 
The model estimated was: 
where 
Yk,t =price differential in the tth week of time period k, 
k = 1 before structural change, 
k > 2 after structural change, 
t = 1 for the first week of a period k, 
t = 2 for the second week of a period k, 
t = n for the nth week of a period k, 
a = difference between the average price at the jth market 
and the average price at the six terminal markets, 
ak = effect of the kth time interval, 
Ik = binary variable such that 
Ik = 1, for each week in the interval k, and 
Ik = 0 otherwise, 
£kt = independent, normally distributed errors with mean = 0 
and variance = 0 2 . 
In addition, the influence of changes in relative supplies on relative 
prices was analyzed as a possible additional factor in this model. One of 
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the constraints found was the availability of data about local slaughter of 
hogs. The USDA publishes a quarterly report on inventories by state ("Hogs 
and Pigs 11 ), but its generality makes it impossible to analyze any weekly or 
even monthly change . Also, the specific objective of this study was to 
analyze the local changes in the price level, but the report gives state 
data, which do not correspond to the procurement areas defined above. 
While relative supply levels in the markets being compared were not avail-
able for incorporation into this model, we did examine whether the total 
U.S. supply of hogs was a factor influencing relative market prices by us-
ing 1"eekly reports of the daily slaughter provided by the USDA. If dif-
ferent demand elasticities were prevalent i n the subject market and the 
comparison markets, a shift in overall supply levels could lead to short-
term changes in relative market prices before geographic market arbitrage 
became effective. National hog slaughter supply was incorporated into the 
model for several preliminary analyses of price behavior, but was not shown 
to be significant, and, as a consequence, it was eliminated from further 
consideration in the study. 
The tests of Bk were conducted at the a= 0.05 level, which limits the 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true to 5%. That 
is, the probability of getting a larger value of 11 t 11 will not be greater 
than 0.05 if the parameter is really equal to zero. The "t" values as-
sociated with this level are ± 1.96, since we used a two-tai l ed test due to 
our interest in testing if the parameters differ from zero and not only if 
they were larger or smaller than zero. 
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CHAPTER IV. RESULTS 
The statistical results of the analysis are presented and interpreted 
in this chapter. The effects of the five closing plants and the one that 
reopened are divided into primary and secondary effects. Primary effects 
are those changes in the relative price level that occurred in the local 
market area of the plant that closed. Secondary effects are the changes 
in the relative price levels of the other markets studied here which are 
related to the closing (or opening) of the same plant. 
Primary Effects 
Case study 1: Madison, Wisconsin 
The first plant closing to be analyzed was located in Madison, Wiscon-
sin. Period one consisted of 26 weeks from March 25, 1978, through Septem-
ber 15, 1978. During this period, Oscar Mayer was still operating its 
Madison plant. After the plant was closed on September 15, 1978, a series 
of two-week dummy variables was used during 26 weeks, and a fina l dummy was 
used for the next 26 weeks, ending September 15, 1979. 
Table 1 contains the average of weekly prices for Wisconsin and the 
six markets used for comparison. It also shows the relative price change 
in this market in comparison to the other mark-ets . A "t" value was calcu-
lated to determine whether the price difference in each time period after 
the plant closed was significantly different from relative price levels 
prevailing while the plant was open. 
An examination of the values contained in Table 1 indicates that, be-
fore the plant closing, average prices in the six control markets were 
$1.70 above the average prices in Wisconsin. After the closing and until 
Table 1. Average of weekly prices and differentials between Wisconsin and other marketsa 
( 1) (2) Average pricesb ( 5} (6) (7) 
Periods No. of (3) ( 4) Price Changes in price "t" 
weeks Wisconsin Other marketsc differential differential 
(3 - 4) compared to value Period 1 
1 (base} 26 46.99 48.69 -1. 70 
2 2 49.91 51.44 -1.53 0.17 0.67 
3 2 51 . 03 52 .90 -1.87 -0.17 -0.66 
4 2 51. 67 53.11 -1.44 -0 .26 0.99 
5 2 48. 51 50.01 -1 . 50 0.20 0. 78 
6 2 47.21 49.20 -1.99 -0.29 -1.13 
7 2 48.29 50.50 -2.21 -0.51 -1.97 
8 2 49.08 51.24 -2.16 -0.46 -1. 77 
9 2 48.99 50.89 -1. 90 -0.20 -0 . 77 I-' 
CX> 
10 2 51.20 53.50 -2.30 -0.60 -2.29* 
11 2 52.26 54 .87 -2.61 -0.91 -3. 48* 
12 2 53. 39 55.59 -2.20 -0.50 -1.91 
13 2 52 . 77 54.83 -2.06 -0.36 -1.38 
14 2 50.01 51. 71 -1. 70 0.00 -0.02 
15 26 40.89 52.52 -1.63 0.07 0.74 
aFor the period March 25, 1978 through September 15, 1979. 
bln dollars per hundred-weight. 
c 
()naha, South St. Joseph and Average of weekly orices in Indianapolis, Sioux Falls, Sioux City, 
Kansas City. · 
*Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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period 5 (8 weeks after), no significant changes occurred. After nine 
weeks, relative prices in Wisconsin seem to fall steadily, although not 
significantly. In periods 10 and 11 (17-20 weeks after the closing), Wis-
consin prices fell significantly below the difference of $1.70 prevailing 
before the cl osing ($0.60 and $0.91 lower). After week 21, there is an up-
ward trend until prices went back to what seems to be a "normal level," six 
months after the plant closed. 
Figure 2 shows the average prices for each week (solid line), and the 
averages for selected time periods used in the analysis (dashed line). 
This figure shows some high and low differentials before and after the 
closing which could be statistically significant. But, the question criti-
cal to this study is not only whether or not the closing (or reopening) of 
a plant significantly affected prices, but, also, if the effects had a 
clear pattern. This is important since the preliminary analysis of the 
data shows that factors other than number of competitors and supply may 
have a temporary significant effect on the price level. For instance, 
significant drops in relative prices may be associated with specific local 
weather conditions . 
Case study 2: St. Louis, Missouri 
John Morrell 's plant in St. Louis closed on December 23, 1980. In 
this case, the 26 week period before the closing was not used due to an un-
usual drop in relative prices in St. Louis that happened in the five weeks 
between July 26, 1980, and August 23, 1980. This inexplicable drop of the 
St. Louis prices relative to the other six terminal markets used for com-
parison led to the deletion of observations prior to August 23, 1980. 
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After the closing, a series of two-week dummy variables was used dur-
ing 23 weeks. After that, dummy variables for periods coinciding with the 
closing of other plants in this study were incorporated into the model to 
determine whether structural shocks in other areas had reverberations in 
this market as well (see Figure 3). 
Table 2 shows the price differentials between St. Louis and the six 
markets, together with the 11 t 11 values associated with every change in the 
price difference compared to the intercept. 
The plot of the observations shows that relative prices before the 
closing did not have any clear pattern and they oscillated around the mean 
differential in a random fashion. While relative prices did, in fact, fall 
slightly during 18 weeks after the closing, the "t" values for the periods 
after the closing were not significant. 
However, the average decline was $0.23 during these 18 weeks, which 
could be viewed as a significant economic change by some producers in the 
market. 
Case study 3: Rochelle, Illinois 
Swift ' s plant in Rochelle closed on December 26, 1980 , and it was re-
opened by Dubuque Packing Co. eight months later and operated on a two-
shi ft basis soon after it reopened. The primary effects of both the clos-
ing and the reopening will be analyzed here. 
Plant closing The plant in Rochelle was closed only three days 
after the closing of John Morrell 's plant in St. Louis. For this reason, 
all periods, but the first one, correspond to the ones defined for the case 
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Table 2. Average of weekly prices and differentials between St. Louis and other marketsa 
( 1) (2) -- Average prices0 -- (5) (6) (7) 
Periods No. of (3) (4) Price Change in price "t" differential weeks St. Louis Other marketsc differential compared to value (3 - 4) Period 1 
1 18 47.54 47.41 0.13* 
2 2 43.15 43.31 -0 . 16 -0.29 -1.10 
3 2 42.18 42.26 -0.08 -0.21 -0. 80 
4 2 42.22 42.38 -0.16 -0.29 -1.11 
5 2 44.01 44.19 -0.18 -0.31 -1.17 
6 2 41.64 41.72 -0.08 -0.21 -0.80 
7 2 39.62 39.58 0.04 -0.09 -0.33 
8 2 40.43 40.55 -0.12 -0.25 -0.92 
N 
9 2 40.32 40. 57 -0.25 -0.38 -1.42 w 
10 2 40. 75 40.65 0. 10 -0.03 -0.10 
11 2 41. 79 41.39 0.40 0.27 1.04 
12 3 46.16 45. 72 0.44 0.31 1.41 
13 10 51.17 51.47 -0.30 -0.43 -3.05* 
14 2 51.38 51.54 -0.16 -0 .29 -1.11 
15 10 47.66 47.54 0.12 -0.01 -0.04 
16 19 45.90 45.65 0.25 0.12 1.05 
aFor the period August 30, 1980, through March 20, 1982 . 
bln dollars per hundred-weight. 
cAverage of weekly prices in Indianapolis, Sioux Falls, Sioux City, Omaha, South St. Joseph and 
Kansas City. 
*Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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of St. Louis. Period 1 consisted of 26 weeks from July 5, 1980, through 
December 27, 1980. 
The results presented in Table 3 indicate that no significant change 
in relative prices was noted after the plant closed. Since Rochelle was a 
fairly small plant (2000 head slaughtered daily), this result is not sur-
prising. The only aberration (period 5) appears to be related to a severe 
snow storm in the Midwest which disrupted normal market patterns temporar-
ily (see Figure 4) . 
Plant reopening Table 4 shows the results of comparing the average 
relative prices in Rochelle before it was closed, during 35 weeks after the 
closing, and 29 weeks after it was reopened. The 11 t 11 values for periods 2a 
and 3a were insignificant with respect to the intercept, but the values in 
column 6 are interesting, since they show how, after the closing, relative 
prices in Rochelle were on the average $0 .10 lower, and went up by an aver-
age of $0.28 after the reopening. This higher level appears to be related 
to the double shift operation of the plant when it was reopened. The di-
rect comparison of the relative price level after the closing and after the 
reopening showed that this increase of $0.28 was significant (t = 2.11) . 
The dashed line in Figure 5 represents the average relative prices be-
fore the closing, after the closing and after the reopening. 
Case study 4: Davenport, Iowa 
In this case study, the period prior to the closing of the plant in 
Davenport consisted of 23 weeks from January 3, 1981, through June 6, 1981. 
After the closing, a series of two-week dunvny variables was used during 12 
weeks. The last period consisted of 10 weeks . The reasons for choosing 
Table 3. Average of weekly prices and differentials between Rochelle and other marketsa 
(1) (2) Average pricesb (5) (6) (7) 
(3) ( 4) Price Change in price lltll 
Period No. of Rochelle Other ma rketsc differential differential value weeks (3 - 4) compared to Period 1 
1 26 45.97 46.96 -0.99 
2 , 2 42.08 ·43.31 -1.23 -0.24 -0 .74 
3 2 41.45 42 .26 -0.81 0. 18 0. 56 
4 2 41.35 42.38 -1.03 -0.04 -0. 14 
5 2 42.18 44.19 -2.01 -1.02 -3.21* 
6 2 40.57 41. 72 -1.15 -0.16 -0.49 
7 2 38.64 39.58 -0. 94 0.05 0.15 
8 2 39.63 40. 55 -0.92 0.07 0.21 
9 2 39.45 40. 57 -1.12 -0.13 -0.41 
N 
<.Tl 
10 2 39. 59 40.65 -1.06 -0. 07 -0.22 
11 2 40 .86 41.39 -0 . 53 0.46 1.45 
12 3 44.78 45 . 72 -0.94 0.05 0.17 
13 10 50.36 51.47 -1.11 -0.12 -0. 75 
14 2 50.49 51.54 -1.05 -0.06 -0.20 
15 10 46.55 47.54 -0.99 0.00 0.03 
16 19 44.93 45.65 -0.72 0.27 2. 02* 
aFor the period July 5, 1980, through March 20, 1982. 
bin dollars per hundred-weight. 
cAverage of weekly prices in Indianapolis, Sioux Falls, Sioux City, Omaha, South St . Joseph and 
Kansas City . 
*Significant at the 0.05 level . 
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Table 4. Average of weekly prices and differentials between Rochelle and other marketsa 
(1) (2) A . b -- verage prices - - (5) (6) (7) 
Period No. of (3) (4) Price Change in price ll tll 
weeks c differential differential value Roc helle Other markets (3 - 4) compared to Period 1 
lad 26 45.97 46.96 -0 .99 
2ae 35 44.30 45.39 -1.09 -0.10 - 0.86 
3/ 29 45.49 46.30 -0.81 0.18 1.46 
a For the period July 5, 1980, through March 20, 1982. 
bln dollars per hundred-weight. 
cAverage of weekly prices in Indianapolis, Sioux Falls, Sioux City, South St. Joseph, Onaha and 
Kansas City. 
dla is period 1 of Table 3: the average price level before the closing. 
e2 . a is 
closing and 
ing. 
f3 . a is 
the average of periods 2-14 of Table 3 and represents the average price level after the 
before the reopening. 
the average of periods 15-16 of Table 3 and is the average price level after the reopen-
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these periods are related to structural changes happening in adjacent mar-
kets and will be fully explained when the secondary effects of other mar-
kets are discussed in the next section. 
Table 5 and Figure 6 show that no significant decrease in the relative 
price level was found after the closi ng, although relative prices had an 
average decline of $0.19 during twelve weeks after the closing. 
Case study 5: Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 
In the analysis of the closing of Wilson's plant in Oklahoma, period 1 
consisted of 52 weeks from August 23, 1980, through August 15, 1981, when 
the plant was closed. As in the other case studies, two-week durrmy vari-
ables were used after the closing, and a final single dummy variable was 
used for the 11 weeks between January 9, 1982, and March 20, 1982. 
Table 6 shows the results of the analysis, which are plotted in Fig-
ure 7. Even though only two periods (6 and 7) showed a significant drop in 
relative prices, it is important to consider the clear pattern of low 
prices following the closing. Periods 6 and 7 seem to be the valley of a 
set of observations which were always below the average of period 1. Be-
yond this valley, relative prices seem to follow an upward trend, reaching 
near normal levels 17-20 weeks after theplant closing, then reverting to 
levels averaging $0 .45 less than before the plant closed. 
It was interesting to observe the relative price behavior in later 
weeks. Unfortunately, the USDA shows no report of the prices in Indianapo-
1 is for the weeks ending on March 27, April 3, April 10, April 24 and April 
31, 1982. It was decided to include these weeks in the analysis of Okla-
homa, but to omit Indianapolis as a comparative market. 
Table 5. Average of weekly prices and differentials between Davenport and other marketsa 
(1) (2) A . b (5) (6) (7) verage prices 
(3) (4) Price Change in price llt" 
Period No. of Davenport Other marketsc differentials differentials value weeks compared to (3 - 4) Period 1 
1 23 40.48 42.31 -1.83 
2 2 . 47 .85 49.95 -2.10 -0.27 - 1.00 
3 2 50.67 52.88 -2.21 -0.38 - 1.41 
4 2 50.60 52 . 29 -1.69 0.14 0.50 
5 2 48.72 50.68 -1 .96 -0.13 - 0.49 
w 
6 2 49.45 51.55 -2.10 -0. 27 - 0.98 0 
7 2 49 .46 51.55 -2.09 -0.26 - 0.94 
8 10 45.57 47.51 -1. 94 -0.11 - 0.75 
aFor the period January 3, 1981, through November 7, 1981. 
b In dollars per hundred-weight. 
cAverage of ~eekly prices in lndianapol is, Sioux Falls, Sioux City, Omaha, South St. Joseph and 
Kansas City. 
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Table 6. Average of weekly prices and di fferentials between Oklahoma and other marketsa 
(1) (2) Average pricesb (5) (6) (7) 
( 3} ( 4} Price Change in price lltll 
Period No. of Oklahoma Other marketsc differentials differential s value weeks (3 - 4} compared to Period 1 
1 52 46.25 45.95 0. 30 
2 2 51. 78 51. 54 0.24 -0.06 -0 .12 
3 2 50.83 50.39 0.44 0.14 0.26 
4 2 49.40 49.88 -0 .48 -0.78 -1.05 
5 2 47.53 47.67 -0.14 -0.44 -0.83 
6 2 44.41 45.39 -0.98 -1.28 -2.42* 
7 2 43.35 44.09 -0.74 -1.04 -1. 97* 
w 
8 2 43.02 42. 99 0.03 -0.27 -0.52 N 
9 2 42.14 42.17 -0.03 -0.33 -0.62 
10 2 41.00 40.61 0.39 0.09 0.17 
11 2 41.28 40 .95 0.33 0.03 0.07 
12 11 48.32 48.47 -0.15 -0.45 -1. 77 
aFor the period August 23, 1980, through March 20, 1982. 
bin dollars per hundred weight. 
cAverage of weekly prices in Indianapolis, Sioux Falls, Sioux City, Omaha, South St. Joseph and 
Kansas City. 
*Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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The results showed "t" values very similar to the ones of Table 6, 
with the exception of period 12, which had a significant 11 t 11 value of 
-3.44. This result suggests that nine months after the closing, relative 
prices in Oklahoma had not reached the level they had before the closing of 
the plant. 
Primary effects: an overview 
The analysis of the six structural changes presented previously showed 
that the relative prices of Wisconsin and Oklahoma City were significantly 
affected by the closing in their areas, and the prices in Rochelle were 
significantly affected by the reopening of the local plant. 
Relative prices in Wisconsin began to decrease 9 weeks after the clos-
ing, and reached the lowest level 11 weeks later, when relative prices were 
$0.91 below the original level. A steady increase returned relative prices 
back to a "normal" level 26 weeks after the closing. 
In Oklahoma City, the most significant drop happened during weeks 9 
and 10 after the closing, when relative prices were $1 .28 below the levels 
prior to the closing. As it was explained earlier, it seems that relative 
prices in Oklahoma City had not gone back to "normal " levels nine months 
after the closing. This is not surprising since the closing plant was the 
largest volume plant in Oklahoma, slaughtering approximately 80 percent of 
the total slaughtered in the state (Ward, 1982, p. 2). 
The analysis of the reopening of the plant in Rochelle showed that 
relative prices in Rochelle increased significantly by an average of $0.28 
after the reopening. While the plant closing had no effect on prices, 
35 
apparently the reopening, operating with a double shift, was sufficient 
to exert a significant impact on prices . 
Whi l e the simultaneous closing of the plants in St . Louis and Rochelle 
did not have a statistically significant impact on the relative prices pre-
vailing in both areas, relative prices in St. Louis were slightly lower 
followi ng the closing, decreasing as much as $0.38 during weeks 15 and 16 
after the closing . 
The closing of the plant in Davenport did not have a significant ef-
fect on the local relative prices, although the average relative price 
after the closing was $0.19 lower than before. 
A summary of the primary effects of the six structural changes is 
represented in Figure 8. The values plotted are 5-week moving averages, 
except for the ones of week 0, which are the a values reported in the pre-
ceding tables. 
If relative prices after plant closings have two possible outcomes, 
"success 11 (weekly relative prices rise) and "fail ure 11 (weekly relative 
prices decrease), and their probabilities are e = 0.5 and 1 - e, then the 
number of successes , 0 or 1, has a Bernoulli distribution. 
In order to test the null hypothesis that e = 0.5 for the case studies 
presented here, we tabulated the number of times relative prices decreased 
after t he plant closings and before other structural changes happened. 
Relative prices in Wisconsin were lower than the level prevailing be-
fore the closing during 20 weeks out of 26; i'n St. Louis, 19 out of 23; in 
Rochelle, 13 out of 23; in Davenport, 8 out of 12; and in Oklahoma, 16 out 
of 20. The total number of failures (relative price decreases) was 76 , 
while the total number of successes was 28. 
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The large number of trials allows the use of the statistic "Z" since 
a binomial distribution approaches a standard nonnal distribution when 
n __...... Thus, we can use 
x - ne z = - ---
lne(l-e) 
to test the null hypothesis that x - ne = 0, 
where 
x = number of failures, 
n = number of trials, and 
e = o. s. 
The value of "Z" obtained is 4.70; thus, we reject the null hypothesis that 
there is equal probability of price increase or decrease after a plant 
closing, at the 0.01 level. The results suggest that there is a greater 
tendency for relative prices to decrease below the level prevail i ng before 
the closing than to increase . 
Secondary Effects 
Madison, Wisconsin 
During the years 1980 and 1981, there were several plant closings and 
openings near the edge of the fonner Madison plant hog procurement area as 
well as in more distant areas that could also have an impact on prices in 
the Wisconsin market . The primary effects of each indi vi dual pl ant closing 
or opening were analyzed in the previous section; here, we will focus on 
the impact which those plant changes had on the relative prices of Wis-
consin. 
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The analysis was conducted using single dummy variables for the peri-
ods following the closing of the plants in St. Louis and Rochelle, the re-
opening of the plant in Rochelle and the closing of the Dubuque plant on 
November 1, 1981. 
Table 7 and Figure 9 surrvnarize the changes in relative prices associ-
ated with these plant changes. Whi l e some of these plant changes had lit-
tle impact in their own area, apparently market arbitrage activities by 
some market participants led to more appreciable impacts on adjacent mar-
kets. 
The results suggest that Wisconsin relative prices fell significantly 
by an average of $0.42 after the closing of the plants in St. Louis and 
Rochelle. The reopening of the plant in Rochelle seems to be associated 
with an increase in the relative price level; the direct comparison of 
relative prices before and after the reopening showed that, in period 3, 
the mean was significantly higher by an average of $0.53 over the mean of 
period 2 (t = 3.71). The direct comparison of periods 3 and 4 showed a 
significant decrease in the price level of $0.69 during period 4 when the 
closing of the plant in Dubuque occurred (t = -3.47). 
A surrmary of the secondary impacts is represented in Figure 10. 
St. Louis, Missouri 
The analysis of the effects of other plant closings or openings on 
the relative prices in St . Louis suggests that the closing of the plant in 
Davenport seems to be associated with the decrease of the relative prices · 
in St. Louis, while other changes had no significant impacts. 
Table 7. Average of weekly prices and differentials between Wisconsin and other marketsa 
(I) (2) Average prices (5) 
(3) (4) No . of Price c 
weeks Wisconsin Other markets differential Periods 
1 
2 
3 
4 
26 
35 
10 
14 
45. 67 
43.67 
46.35 
42.57 
46 . 97 
45.39 
47.54 
44.45 
(3 - 4) 
-1.30 
-1. 72 
-1.19 
-1.88 
aFor the period July 5, 1980, through February 13, 1982. 
bln dollars per hundred-weight. 
( 6) 
Change in price 
differential 
compared to 
the intercept 
-0.42 
0.11 
-0.58 
(7) 
"t" 
value 
- 4. 39* 
0.81 
- 4. 73* 
cAverage of weekly prices in Indianapolis, Sioux Falls, Sioux City, Omaha, South St. Joseph and 
Kansas City. 
*Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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On June 4, 1981, Oscar Mayer closed its plant in Davenport, Iowa . A 
single dulTITly (period 13 on Table 2) was used for the time span between this 
event and the closing of Wilson's plant in Oklahoma. The level of St. 
Louis relative prices dropped significantly (t = -3.05) during these 10 
weeks as compared to the intercept. 
The other plant changes are represented by periods 14, 15 and 16 in 
Table 2. Period 14 represents the two weeks between the closing of the 
plant in Oklahoma and the reopening of the plant in Rochelle. Period 15 
represents the ten weeks between this reopening and the closing of the 
plant in Dubuque. The last period contains the observations from that date 
until March 20, 1982. The results were not significant for any of these 
periods. 
The insignificant results for the periods before the closing of the 
plant in Davenport (2-12) and after the closing of the plant in Oklahoma 
(14-16) allow the usage of single dummies to cover both periods. 
Table 8 and Figure 11 show the values for the periods mentioned. 
Again, the period of 10 weeks after the closing of the plant in Davenport 
was significant. After those 10 weeks, relative prices in St . Louis not 
only went back to "nonnal" levels, but were $0.15 higher than the inter-
cept. This result is not significant compared to the intercept, but it is 
significant compared to the level of relative prices during the 10 weeks 
following the closing of the plant in Davenport. This increase in the 
price level cannot be statistically related to the closing of the plant in 
Oklahoma, the reopening of the one in Rochelle nor the closing of the plant 
in Dubuque, because, individually, they were all insignificant with respect 
Table 8. Average of weekly prices and differentials between St. Louis 
(1) (2) Average pricesb ( 5) 
Price Periods No. of (3) (4) differential weeks Other marketsc 
lad 
2ae 
3af 
St. Louis (3 - 4) 
41 44.55 44.49 0.06 
10 51.17 51.47 -0.30 
31 46.82 46 .61 0.21 
aFor the period August 30, 1980, through March 20, 1982. 
bln dol l ars per hundred-we ight . 
and other marketsa 
(6) (7) 
Change in price "t" differential value compared to 
Period 1 
-0.36 -2 .95* 
0.15 1.65 
cAverage of weekly prices in Indianapolis, Sioux Falls, Sioux City, Omaha, South St. Joseph and 
Kansas City. 
dPeriod la is the average of periods 1-12 of Table 2. 
ePeriod 2a is period 13 of Table 3. 
f Period 3a is the average of periods 14-16 of Table 2. 
*Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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to the intercept, but it is noticeable from Figure 3 that the biggest in-
crease of relative prices can be related to the reopening of the plant in 
Rochelle. 
Figure 12 surrmarizes the secondary impacts on the relative prices of 
St. Louis . 
Rochelle, Illinois 
Single durrmy variables were used to determine the impact on Rochelle 
prices of the plant closings in Davenport (period 13 of Table 3), Oklahoma 
(period 14) and Dubuque (period 16). 
The results show no evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis that 
the change in the price differential compared to period 1 was different 
from zero, with the exception of period 16 whose "t" value was 2.02. An-
other analysis was made using a single dummy for the first 15 periods and 
the 11 t 11 value for period 16 was fou nd insignificant. 
Thus, relative prices in Rochelle were not significantly influenced 
by any of the other plant closings. 
Davenport, Iowa 
The description of the periods used in the analysis of the closing of 
Oscar Mayer's plant in Davenport is very important due to the many signifi-
cant results that were found. 
Table 9 contains the average of weekly prices for Davenport and the 
mean of the six markets. It also shows the differentials by period and the 
"t" values associated with each of them. 
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Figure 12. Changes in St. Louis relative prices associated with 
other structural changes (Tables 2 and 8) 
Table 9. Average of weekly prices and differentials between Davenport and other marketsa 
(1) (2) A . b verage prices ( 5) 
(3) ( 4) Price Periods No. of 
Other marketsc differential 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
weeks · Davenport (3 - 4) 
17 46. 01 47 .35 -1.34 
23 40 .48 42.31 -1.83 
12 49.46 51.48 -2.02 
10 45. 57 47.51 -1.94 
19 43.27 45.65 -2.38 
aFor the period September 6, 1980, through March 20 , 1982. 
bln dollars per hundred-weight. 
(6) 
Change in price 
differentials 
compared to 
eriod 1 
-0.49 
-0.68 
-0.60 
-1.04 
(7) 
"t" 
values 
- 3.23* 
- 3.85* 
- 3.07* 
- 6.50* 
cAverage of weekly prices in Indianapolis, Sioux Falls, Sioux City, Clnaha , South St. Joseph and 
Kansas City . 
*Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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In this case, period 1 averages the relative prices around Davenport 
before the closing of the plants in St. Louis and Rochelle. Period 2 
represents the average of the relative prices in Davenport after the clos-
ing of the plants in St. Louis and Rochelle and before the closing of the 
plant in Davenport itself (see Figure 13). 
The results show a significant drop of $0.49 in the relative prices of 
Davenport after the closings in St. Louis and Rochelle (t =-3.23). 
The closing of Davenport is associated with a drop of $0.19 in the 
relative price level, significant with respect to the intercept, but not 
significant with respect to the previous period as shown in the analysis 
of the primary effects. 
Following the reopening of the plant in Rochelle, relative prices 
went up and then dropped steadily, averaging $0.08 higher than the previous 
level. This result is also not significant with respect to period 2. 
Table 9 shows that relative prices in Davenport dropped even to lower 
levels after the closing of the plant in Dubuque (period 5). 
A further analysis was done us ing a single variable for the 45 weeks 
before the closing in Dubuque, but after the closings in St. Louis and 
Rochelle. The results showed a significant (t = -3.55) relative price 
drop of $0.48 after the closing of the Dubuque plant. 
A summary of these results is shown in Table 10. Period 2a averages 
periods 2 through 4 of Table 9 due to the insignificant differences between 
them. The results suggest that, after the closi ng of St. Louis and 
Rochelle, relative prices in Davenport dropped by an average of $0.56 and 
dropped even more by $0.48 after the plant in Dubuque was closed. 
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Figure 13. Changes in Davenport relative prices associated with 
other structural changes 
Table 10. Average of weekly prices and differentials between Davenport and other market:;a 
( 1) (2) A . b verage prices (5) 
Periods No. of (3) ( 4) Price 
weeks Other marketsc differentials Davenport (3 - 4) 
lad 17 46.01 47.35 -1 .34 
2ae 45 43 . 94 45.84 -1.90 
3af 19 43 .27 45.65 -2.38 
aFor the period September 6, 1981, through March 20, 1982 . 
bln dollars per hundred-weight. 
(6) 
Change in price 
differentials 
compared to 
Period 4 
-0.56 
-1 .04 
(7) 
"t" 
values 
- 4.20* 
- 6.52* 
cAverage of weekly prices in Indianapolis, Sioux Falls, Sioux City, Qnaha, South St. Joseph and 
Kansas City. 
dla is period 4 of Table 7 and represents the average price level before the closings of the 
plants in St. Louis and Rochelle. 
e2a is the average of periods 2-13 of Table 7. 
f 3a i s period 14 of Table 7 and is the average price level after the closing of the plant in 
Dubuque. 
*Significant at the 0.05 level. 
U1 
0 
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Up to this moment, it is not possible to determine whether or not 
Davenport relative prices went back to some 11 nonnal 11 level. The last ob-
servations show a positive trend, but it is too early to detennine if they 
will stay close to the price levels they had before the plant closings, or 
if it is only a temporary increase. 
The effects of the secondary impacts are summarized in Figure 14 . 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 
The effects of other plant closings on the prices of Oklahoma were 
analyzed, and none were found to be significant, as would be expected, be-
cause of the great distance between Oklahoma City and the other plants con-
sidered in this study. 
Secondary effects: an overview 
Relative prices in Wisconsin seem to be very sensitive to the struc-
tural changes in other markets, especially those in areas near Wisconsin . 
The closing of the plants in St. Louis and Rochelle is associated with a 
decrease of $0.42 in the price level of Wisconsin. Also, the reopening of 
the plant in Rochelle seems to be associated with the significant increase 
of $0.53 in the relative prices . Finally, relative prices decreased by an 
average of $0.69 after the closing of the plant in Dubuque. 
In St. Loui s, relative prices were significantly affected by the clos~ 
ing in Davenport. The reopening of the plant in Rochelle which had little 
impact on its local prices, did have an impact on the relative prices of a 
more distant market, such as St. Louis. 
Dubuque 
closing 
-0 .48 
Davenport 
prices 
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-0.56 (closing) 
+0.08 (reopening) 
St . Louis 
closing 
*Si gnificant at the 0.05 level. 
Rochell e 
Figure 14. Changes in Davenport relative prices associated with 
other structural changes 
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While we did not have data on prices in Rochelle when the plant in 
Madi son closed, relative prices probably were affected by the closing in 
Madison, since Peoria's relative prices were affected, and Peoria is fairly 
close to Rochelle. Following the closing in Davenport, Rochelle relative 
prices decreased only by $0.12 . This can be attributed to the entering of 
new competitors in the Rochelle market. Personal interviews with some 
other competitors disclosed that three new competitors entered the Rochelle 
market when the plant closed. These new competitors might have compen-
sated for the negative impact of both closings on the relative prices of 
Rochelle. The small impact of the closing of Dubuque on the relative 
prices of Rochelle could be due to the double shift operation of the Ro-
chel le plant beginning at about the time the plant in Dubuque was closed. 
The almost simultaneous closing of the plants in St. Louis and Ro-
chel le had a significant impact on the relative prices of Davenport ($0 .56 
less than the average before the closings). However, the reopening of the 
plant in Rochelle had no signifi cant effect on Davenport 1 s relative pri ces , 
which seems to indicate that the drop of $0.56 was mainly due to the clos-
ing of the plant in St. Louis . Finally, the closing of the plant in Du-
buque seems to be associated with a decrease of $0.48 in the relative price 
level of Davenport. These results for Davenport show that, after all the 
structural changes, relative prices in Davenport were driven down by as 
much as $1.04 below the original level. 
In Oklahoma, secondary effects of other structural changes were found 
insignificant due to the great distance between this market and the ones 
where changes occurred . 
Figure 15 shows some of these secondary effects. 
-0.69 
Dubuque 
+0.13 
54 
+0.27 
-0.06 
-0.42 -0.65 
-0.42 (closing) 
+0.53 
(reopening) 
-0.12 
-0.56 (closin 
+0 .08 
-0 . 31 (cl o s i ng ) 
St. Louis 
+0 . 51 (reopening) 
Figure 15. Some secondary impacts on relative prices associated 
with changes in the number of competing buyers 
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The Ripple Effect of the 
Structural Changes 
It became apparent in our analysis that a plant closing or opening 
often had a noticeable impact on prices in othPr markets, but the impact 
was greater in the nearer markets and less pronounced in more distant mar-
kets. 
In order to examine in more detail whether a ripple effect is present, 
we studied how the price drop in Wisconsin following the Madison plant 
closing reverberated into adjacent and more distant markets. 
Two methods of analysis were used to determine the impact of the clos-
ing of the plant in Madison on other markets. The first method involved 
the analysis of the differentials between the average price of the six ter-
minal markets used for comparison in previous sections, and weekly prices 
in terminal markets in St. Louis and Oklahoma. The second method employed 
involved computing individual price differences between Wisconsin and elev-
en other terminal markets. The time span used for both methods of analy-
sis was also used to analyze the primary effects of the closing of the 
Madison plant. The price behavior in different markets when the plant in 
Madison closed gives a measure of the ripple effect . 
Table 11 and Figure 16 show the results of the analysis of the differ-
entia l s of St. Louis. The price level in St. Louis, right after the closing 
of the plant in Wisconsin, seems to be very similar to the level prior to 
the closing. It is after period 9 that relative prices begin to fall and 
became significantly lower during periods 11 and 12 {$0.65 and $0.55 less 
than the intercept). These periods correspond to the lowest relative price 
levels of Wisconsin af ter the closing (see Figure 2). After period 12, 
Table 11. Average of weekly prices and differentials between St. Louis and other marketsa 
(1) (2) Average pricesb (5) (6) (7) 
No. of (3) (4) Price Change in price "t" Periods differentials weeks St. Louis Other marketsc differential compared to value (3 - 4) Period 4 
l d 26 48. 77 48.69 0.08 
2 2 51. 56 51.44 0. 12 0.04 0.16 
3 2 52.84 52.90 -0 .06 -0.14 -0.56 
4 2 53.27 53.11 0.16 0.08 0. 33 
5 2 50.25 50.01 0.24 0.16 0.63 
6 2 49.17 49.20 -0.03 -0.11 -0.41 
7 2 50 .47 50.50 -0.03 -0 .11 -0.42 
8 2 51.38 51.24 0.14 0.06 0.22 
(Jl 
9 2 50.86 50.89 -0.03 -0.11 -0.42 O'I 
10 2 53 . 10 53.50 -0.40 -0.48 -1.87 
11 2 54 .30 54.87 -0.57 -0.65 -2.55* 
12 2 55.12 55.59 -0.47 -0.55 -2 .16* 
13 2 54.40 54.83 -0.43 -0.51 -1. 99* 
14 2 51. 55 51. 71 -0.16 -0.24 -0.92 
15 26 42.75 42.52 10.23 0. 15 1.56 
aFor the period March 25, 1978 through September 15, 1979. 
bin dollars per hundred-weight. 
cAverage of weekly prices in Indianapolis, Sioux Falls, Sioux City, Omaha, South St. Joseph and 
Kansas City. 
dBefore the Madison plant closed. 
*Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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relative prices in St. Louis had a positive trend until they went back to 
what seems to be a 11 nonnal 11 level. 
The analysis of the relative prices in Oklahoma (not presented here) 
did not show any significant changes during the time period studied. This 
was expected, due to the long distance between Oklahoma City and Madison. 
To see whether similar price behavior would be observed in other mar-
kets relatively close to the Wisconsin market area, the price differentials 
between Wisconsin and 11 tenninal markets were calculated. In this case, 
differentials represent individual comparisons between Wisconsin and each 
market . A first dulTITiy variable was defined for the 26 weeks prior to the 
closing in Madison , followed by three du1T1Tiies for time periods of six 
weeks, and a final one of 26 weeks. 
Table 12 shows insignificant results for periods 3 and 4 in the tenni-
nal markets located in Peoria, Indianapolis and St. Louis. This suggests 
that relative price changes in these nearby areas were not different than 
those in Madison . As it was shown earlier, relative prices in Wisconsin 
seemed to fall from weeks 9 through 21 after the closing, which suggests 
that relative prices in these three markets were also influenced by the 
closing in Madison . 
Another aspect about the tenninal markets in Peoria, Indianapolis and 
St . Louis is that the lowest relative prices after the closing happened 
from weeks 11 to 13, earlier than in any other market. 
The average difference during periods 3 and 4 was calculated for all 
markets, and then they were compared to the average of Oklahoma. This mar-
ket is the most distant one from Madison, and its prices did not seem to be 
influenced by the closing, as shown by the first method of analysis. The 
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(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Change in Change in Change in Lowest relative 
period 4 lltll period 5 "tll (6)+(8) (12) price (no. of 
compared to value compared to value 2 compared to weeks after 
pre-closing pre-closing Oklahoma closing) 
period period 
+0.12 0.56 -0.11 -0.79 -0.07 0.67 12 
-0 .50 - 3.30* +0.18 1. 93 -0.41 0.33 20 
-0. 52 - 4.55* +0.09 1.22 -0.41 0 . 33 18 
-0.17 -0.66 -0.14 -0.90 -0.15 0.59 13 
-0.06 -0 . 30 -0.08 -0.59 -0.20 0.54 11 
-0.76 - 5.19* +0.08 0.88 -0.63 0.11 19 
-0.76 -5.26* +0.13 1.36 -0 . 61 0.13 19 
-0.69 -4.71* +0.13 1.38 -0.57 0.17 19 
-0.59 - 3.96* +0.15 1.58 -0.51 0.23 18 
-0. 72 -3.62* +0 . 08 0 .. 64 -0.56 0.18 18 
- 0.68 -2.26* 0. 00 -0 .01 -0.74 15 
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comparison of the averages suggests that, in the 3 markets nearest Madison 
(Peoria, Indianapolis and St. Louis), prices were from $0.54 to $0.67 low-
er than prices in Oklahoma, almost twice the difference of the other mar-
kets. Further, the price changes diminished as the distance from Madison 
increased 
change was -0.73. 
Figure 17 gives a representation of the ripp1e effects of the closing 
of the p1ant in Madison. 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main objective of this study was to analyze the changes in the 
price levels in local hog markets, related to the closing or opening of hog 
s.laughter plants . It was hypothesized that the closing {opening) of a 
plant would result in lower (higher) relative prices in the relevant mar-
ket. The analysis was conducted using differentials between the average 
weekly prices of the closing {opening) plant and the six large volume mar-
kets most distant from the markets studied . 
An overall look at the resu l ts of the five case studies analyzed here 
suggests that closing a large plant in an area not heavily populated with 
competitors on fringe areas of the Corn Belt can have a noticeable, usually 
short-term, impact on local prices relative to distant markets. Our re-
sults suggest that relative prices in two markets located in fringe areas 
of the Corn Belt (Wisconsin and Oklahoma) were significantly affected by 
the plant closings in their localities. Relative prices in Oklahoma de-
creased more rapidly and drastically than in the other markets studied, and 
had not recovered their 11 normal 11 level nine months after the closing of the 
plant. This result is not surprising, since a preliminary analysis indi -
cates that there were relatively few competitors in the Oklahoma City mar-
ket area and, also, the closing plant was the largest volume plant in the 
state. Wisconsin's relative prices also decreased significantly after the 
closing of the plant in Madison, but, in this case, the drop was by $0 .37 
less than in Oklahoma. Relative prices did go back to 11 no rmal 11 levels soon 
after the closing. It seems that the larger number of competitors in this 
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area, as compared to Oklahoma, responded more quickly to the competitive 
vacuum created by the plant closing. 
Plants that are small, or large but with a large number of competi-
tors, seldom have any significant impact on local r elative prices when t hey 
close. However, the closing of more plants in adjacent markets often has 
an additive impact, so that two plants which might have no strong individ-
ual impact can cause a significant reduction in relative price levels when 
they close, as occurred in eastern Iowa . 
The analysis of th~ positive and negative effects of the plant clos-
ings on weekly relative prices suggests that, although the closings did not 
have a large impact in most cases, they generally did have a negative 
effect. 
Our analysis also shows that markets in the Corn Belt are intercon-
nected, and that the closing or reopening of high volume plants often 
causes noticeable secondary impacts in nearby markets. A general look at 
these impacts will be presented as follows, s ince it shows some of the dy-
namics involved in the hog market. 
The simultaneous closing of the plants in St. Louis and Rochelle seems 
to have reverberated to the markets in Davenport and Wi sconsin, but not to 
Oklahoma due to its great distance from the plants that closed . 
The reopening of the plant in Rochelle affected r elative prices in 
Wisconsin, since plants around Madison draw hogs from areas near Rochelle. 
The reopening did not affect, though, the relative pri ce level of Daven-
port, which may be due to the fact that the plant in Davenport did not have 
buying stations near Rochelle. The significant impact of the Rochelle 
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plant reopening on the relative price level of St. Louis is not surprising 
since they were competing with some buyers who bought hogs from both north-
ern and southern Illinois. 
The closing of the plant in Davenport did not affect the relative 
price level in Wisconsin, since Madison was not within its hog procurement 
area. Even though the plant in Rochelle could draw some hogs from the 
area around Davenport, especially after the double shift operation of the 
plant, relative prices were not affected, possibly due to the Rochelle 
plant going to a double shift and the entry of new competitors in Rochelle 
prompted by the earlier closing of the plant in the area . This could also 
be due to the fact that Davenport's basic procurement area was west of 
Davenport, not east as far as Rochelle. The significant impact of the 
closing of the plant in Davenport on the relative prices of St . Louis might 
have stimulated some buyers operating in both markets to shi f t thei r pur-
chases to the Davenport area, keeping prices from dropping much there, but 
allowing reduced competition in St. Louis to affect pri ces in that more 
distant market. 
After the plant closing in Dubuque, some market arbitrage was taking 
place in nearby areas, like Wisconsin and Davenport, that caused the prices 
to drop. The closing in Dubuque was not noticeable in a more distant mar-
ket like St. Louis, and, more surprisingly, was not noticeable in a rela-
tively close market (Rochelle) . This could be attributed to a compensating 
effect of the double shift operation of the Rochelle plant which began at 
nearly the same time that the Dubuque plant closed. In addition, Du buque's 
closing plant did not have buying stations in the Rochell e area. 
The analysis of the secondary and ripple effects of the closing of the 
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plant in Madison illustrates the dynamics of market arbitrage among inter-
related geographic markets. The results suggest that primary price impacts 
create a ripple effect on prices in adjacent markets; as competitors change 
their buying patterns to capitalize on lower prices, this. in turn, reduces 
the relative prices in their nonnal market area, but less strongly. As the 
impact spreads through the local and regional hog markets, it gradually 
gets more diffused and less noticeable in more distant markets. 
Some Concluding Remarks 
No global generalization can be derived from this study, since not all 
possible variables that influence prices were incorporated into the models. 
Our current level of knowledge about such variables as number, location and 
capacity of competitors is not sufficient to consider the analysis pre-
sented here as a general approximation to the understanding of the spatial 
price equilibrium when structural changes occur . However, there are some 
patterns that are beginning to emerge as a result of the analysis of the 
five case studies. 
Our analysis provides strong evidence that changes in the degree of 
competition in fringe areas affected the local producers' price level more 
drastically than in areas where there were more competitors. Also, in the 
market where there was less competition, local relative prices have not 
gone back to the level that prevailed before the plant closing. 
Another result seen in this study is that changes in the number of 
competitors causes a ripple effect on the relative prices of other markets 
with stronger impacts on nearby markets and gradually weaker impacts as the 
markets become more distant. This showsthat local markets in the Corn Belt 
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are interconnected and that changes in the level of competition may be 
felt by all other markets, depending on their distance from the "epicen-
ter," and the degree of overlap among procurement areas. 
Another result of this analysis is that simultaneous changes or 
changes that occur in a short time span appear to have an additive effect 
in influencing market prices. 
It would be recofTITlended that further analyses of this topic include 
consideration of changes in local hog supply if data are available, in 
order to determine the impact of this important variable on relative prices 
in the short run. Other factors that could influence the extent of price 
impacts in a more general model are the number of competitors, their dis-
tance to the closing (opening) plant, their capacity and the market share 
or concentration ratios of the industry in the area. In detennining the 
net impact of a change in plant numbers on local producers, it would also 
be important to consider the additional cost of hauling and shrink when 
hogs are taken to a more distant market as a result of the closing of a 
local plant. 
The results of this study do not permit accurate prediction of the ef-
fects of a structural change in a market area without more studies that in-
clude some of the previously mentioned variables. However, in those zones 
where there are few competitors, a sign ificant negative effect can be ex-
pected when a major packer stops its buying operations. Also, the fact 
that the markets are interconnected implies that any significant change 
will be most important for the packers and the producers in the local mar-
ket, but can also have a noticeable impact on more distant markets, though 
the impact becomes smaller as the distance increases. 
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Our results suggest that the loss of a plant competing in a local 
market often has little impact, or at most, temporary impact, on local 
market prices . Where the plant is quite large relative to its competitors, 
a siqnificant price effect can be found. However, the loss of several 
plants which have overlapping or adjacent procurement areas can also have 
a similar impact. It is in those situations where hog producers and farm-
ing corrununities need to be aware of the use of policies to maintain the 
present number of competitors, to attract new ones, or to cr.eate new forms 
of enterprises, such as farm cooperatives, which would be able to maintain 
local relative prices. 
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